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“Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”: The Effects of the Expanding Role of
the National Security Council and Mitigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1970
Brenna Parish
The Nixon Administration vastly changed the nature of foreign policy-making within the U.S. bureaucratic offices.
This change was especially evident in the process of shuttle diplomacy during the time, especially within the realm
of moderating peace in the Middle East. The Nixon Administration never executed the terms of their initial ArabIsraeli peace plan, called the Rogers Plan, which Secretary of State William Rogers formulated and negotiated in
1969, and the administration ultimately reformulated the plan into a cease-fire agreement after an increase of
Israeli military aggression in 1970. Within the Nixon Administration, the mitigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict
became complicated due to the competitive relations between foreign policy-making executive bureaucracies. The
expanding authority of National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger and his role of authority as the head of the
National Security Council (NSC) within the U.S. federal government complicated the Nixon Administration’s efforts
to implement the Rogers Plan and alleviate the crisis between Arabs and Israelis due to the implications of the
tensions and policy dysfunction created by bureaucratic politics within the Nixon Administration.
Previous scholars have adopted differing approaches in their research of the Rogers Plan. Some have focused on
the role that the politics within the executive branch of the U.S. government, while others examined issues relating
to global politics, especially in relation to the environment of détente between the American and the Soviet
governments and issues of diplomacy within the Cold War era. According to Craig Daigle, in his work The Limits of
Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973, the failure of Rogers to
implement peace in the Middle East was a result of tensions caused by the U.S.’s desire to avoid conflict with the
Soviet Union. Daigle framed the Rogers Plan within the rational choice context as well as an analysis of Cold War
ideology, and analyzed the plan as a competition over national interests between the United States and the Soviet
Union. He stated that the Nixon Administration’s presentation of the Rogers Plan was not meant to truly
implement peace in the Middle East, but was intended as a barometer for Soviet objectives in the region. The plan
concurrently served as a means to free the U.S. of the effort of more fruitless negotiations with the U.S.S.R., while
maintaining the legitimacy of American interests in the region.1 Nevertheless, these policies aimed primarily
toward obtaining superiority of U.S. political power over the Soviet Union, thus, those negotiating did not consider
the interests of the states impacted by the plan. Due to this, Middle Eastern nations did find the conditions of the
plan favorable and in turn, did not implement these policies. Golda Meir, the prime minister of Israel, did not
approve of the Rogers Plan, and claimed that a “psychological change” must be made in the regimes of other Arab
nations, such as Egypt, before peace plans could be made.2 On the other hand, Arab nations considered the Rogers
Plan too pro-Israel, and the Egyptian government and Palestinian groups claimed that allowing Israel to maintain
even partial control over Jerusalem could be deemed a pacification of expansionism.3 Therefore, the obsession of
the foreign policy-makers in the United States on maintaining peace with the Soviets created additional tension
within the Middle East and lead to a lack of success in their stated goals. Daigle also dismissed the idea that conflict
between Kissinger and Rogers caused dysfunction in policy-making in the Middle East, but he did cite documental
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evidence that indicates that the stance of the National Security Council differed from the State Department, which
caused the NSC to create policy that drifted away from the goals of stated in the Rogers Plan.4
Salim Yaqub, on the other hand, made the argument in “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the ArabIsraeli Conflict” that Henry Kissinger’s pro-Israel stance combined with the president’s preference for the opinions
of his National Security Advisor largely influenced the Nixon Administration’s policy in the Middle East. Yaqub
applied the perspective of personality politics to the lack of application of the Rogers Plan, where he attributed the
failure of the peace plan to Nixon’s growing reliance on Kissinger’s advisement. Despite Kissinger’s lack of authority
or control in Middle Eastern matters in 1969, Kissinger openly shared his opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict with
Nixon. According to Yaqub, Kissinger, influenced by his experience as a Jew, favored the Israeli side of the conflict
and persuaded Nixon into taking a more pro-Israel stance.5 Much of this argument relies on the influence of
Kissinger’s personal advisement, and Yaqub draws upon the example of when Rogers reported to Nixon in 1970
that Egypt was willing to accept the Rogers Plan’s compromise if Israel could be persuaded to implement their end
of the deal. Nonetheless, Nixon still favored Kissinger’s opinion that the U.S. would not pressure Israel into
accepting an agreement that might cause the nation to become embittered toward the state.6
Other scholars blamed the Nixon Administration’s failure to create an effective peace plan on other external
forces. William Quandt, a member of the NSC during this time, claimed in his book Decades of Decisions that the
failure of the first overarching peace plan came from the utilization of negotiations by the Soviet Union and the
U.S. to create a peace plan. The concept of “linkage,” or the diplomatic framework where certain nations act as
representatives for other nations at a negotiating table as a lawyer might represent their “clients”, was essential to
the legitimacy of the talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. According to Quandt, these nations upheld different
agendas than their respective nations and, therefore, did not formulate an agreement that best fit their “client”
nations.7 After the represented nations reacted in accordance to this unpopular peace plan, the U.S. then
readjusted their diplomatic initiatives in order to take on more modest approaches. This was followed by a shift in
executive power away from State Department officials who focused on regional issues, as those opinions
dominated during the formation of the faulty initial plan.8 In Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, Charles Smith
also faulted the Nixon Administration’s inability to draft and execute a significant Arab-Israeli peace plan on Israel’s
drastic reactions against the first Rogers Plan, a more drastic and ambitious plan than the later cease-fire
agreement. The initial plan garnered such striking public reactions from Israeli politicians and Prime Minister Golda
Meir, leading to Israel’s decision to increase their air strikes on Egypt rather than an advent of peace. On top of
this, Kissinger’s “globalist” vision focused on Cold War issues rather than Rogers’ “regionalist” perspective that
focused on Middle Eastern issues, which lead to the creation of a modest cease-fire instead of a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace plan.9 Unlike previous research, this paper will investigate the role that Kissinger’s increasing
influence as the NSA within foreign policy-making bureaucracies complicated the execution of the State
Department policy known as the Rogers Plan.10
Nixon’s early goals for his administration focused on the re-distribution of power within his cabinet, specifically
within the foreign policy-related members. A main factor of this power distribution was his delegation of multiple
tasks and responsibilities to the National Security Council, which would have traditionally been delegated to the
State Department.11 With this transition of power and responsibility came an increased reliance upon the
leadership of the NSA. This contrasted the typical mode of upper-level executive decision-making of previous
presidents who relied heavily upon their Secretaries of State, even among those presidents who served in office
after the National Security Act created the NSC in 1947. This shift in power among these federal bureaucracies
came, in part, due to the types of people Nixon appointed to these perspective positions, which in turn shaped
what functions differing departments took within the course of his administration. A New York Times article from
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January 1, 1969 examined the possible implications of the choice of appointees to foreign policy positions. The
article focused on the role of the State Department in Nixon’s upcoming term as commander-in-chief, and
predicted that the president-elect would take a much more active role in foreign policy making during his time in
office due to his early composition of his cabinet and bureaucratic appointees, especially in regard to the State
Department. According to the article, Nixon initially advised his cabinet leaders to choose their “second-level”
associates based on who they trusted instead of choosing them based on political affiliations, which brought more
power to the upper echelons of the State Department since the more experienced undersecretaries would not be
forced to delegate power towards lower-level bureaucrats due to a lack of experience or knowledge in foreign
policy as weaker politically appointed undersecretaries did during the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations.12 The
reporter asserted that the NSC and the State Department’s perspective roles were evident through Nixon’s choice
of individuals to lead these organizations. The choice of Rogers as Secretary of State showed Nixon’s reliance on
the State Department for counsel on international affairs, as the article stated that “it has long been assumed that
the Secretary of State would be less of a policy innovator… than a trusted counselor to the president- a
relationship that has already been demonstrated between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers.” The writer also predicted
that Rogers’ experience working as an effective litigator would lead the State Department towards mitigating and
negotiating its way through crises.13 William Rogers, who obtained training as a lawyer and served as an assistant
district attorney before World War II, then worked as both a deputy attorney general and the attorney general
under President Eisenhower. Through these endeavors, he had not obtained much knowledge of foreign policy.
Rogers was also an important member of the Republican Party since the 1950s, and worked at the United Nations
while at his private practice. This meant that Rogers, for Nixon, was a safe pick as the president’s first-term
Secretary of State.14 Nonetheless, despite Rogers’ relative lack of experience in foreign policy that would serve to
undermine his actual influence as a form of “counsel” to Nixon, Nixon gained a valuable asset for negotiations in
choosing Rogers as the head of the State Department due to his experience in mitigating conflicts.
Kissinger reinforced the idea that Secretary Rogers’ intended role in the executive branch constituted mainly
negotiating rather than advising, and he stated within his autobiography, “[Nixon] said he was looking for a good
negotiator, rather than a policymaker.”15 This proved to be true in the Arab-Israeli case, as Nixon initially
emphasized the State Department’s role in negotiating peace in the Middle East through Secretary Rogers, while
he grew more dependent on Kissinger’s advice. Additionally, the New York Times article predicted Kissinger’s role
within foreign policy making to be influential, as “Mr. Nixon has also assigned a strong role in foreign policy
formation to the National Security Council and his assistant, Henry Kissinger, an articulate ‘idea man’ from the
academic world.”16 Kissinger grew up in Germany in a Jewish household in Germany, but escaped from the Nazi
regime and moved to the United States in 1938 where he received a PhD. in political science from Harvard. After
obtaining his doctorate, Kissinger held a professorial position at Harvard, served in various government agencies,
and had worked for the NSC prior to Nixon’s election.17 Kissinger’s academic stamina eventually proved to be
influential in his growing importance throughout his time in the Nixon Administration. 18 Moreover, the
instatement of a Secretary of State such as William Rogers, who lacked the foreign policy experience, the strong
personality, and the intellectual background of other members of the administration, such as Kissinger, reveals
initial lack of empowerment of the State Department as a force to create innovative policy within the
administration. Through the acquisition of Rogers as the head of the State Department, Nixon granted a larger
share the role of guiding U.S. foreign policy to other leaders and other departments.19 Furthermore, since Nixon
valued his own understanding and leadership on foreign policy issues, he relied more heavily on NSC advisement
than State Department implementation. Nixon’s dependence on the NSC distanced the president’s from a reliance
on a vast, intricate bureaucracy, like the State Department, for advisement, and allowed him to make decisions
based on the opinions of a smaller, select group of individuals. Due to these personal differences, and differences
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in the departments of the objectives and roles of the NSC and the State Department, the power within the U.S.
executive foreign policy-making bureaucracies shifted within the course of Nixon’s tenure as president.
Nixon’s means of increasing the NSC’s power within the executive branch went beyond establishing a strong
department head, as his policy-making became heavily reliant on the role of advisement. He also ordered an
excessive amount of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda
(NSDM) from the NSC’s Senior Review Group (SRG).20 Because of this, information regarding foreign policy
decisions filtered through the policy agenda and geopolitical perspective of the Council and ultimately Kissinger
before it reached Nixon’s desk; therefore, Kissinger became an essential decision maker within the process of
analyzing political issues, and, therefore, his overall perspective on issues such as the Middle East and the Cold
War context vastly shaped the policy output of the U.S. at the time. Additionally, Nixon utilized the NSC to readjust
channels of power within the executive branch; for example, he made the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directly
accountable to the NSC.21 Thus, Kissinger, as the NSA, gained control of information provided by numerous
intelligence-oriented bureaucracies, and became the primary means of presenting such intelligence to President
Nixon.
In this way, Kissinger gained immense control within the Nixon Administration because of the president’s
empowerment of the NSC in analyzing data that pertained to foreign relations, which he then presented potential
policy decisions to Nixon. Although the National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC in order to “advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies,”22 Nixon’s wide reliance on
such advisement to aid his own decision-making coupled with the President’s intense focus on foreign policy issues
caused the influence of this group to grow immensely. As he became more involved in foreign policy than previous
Cold War era leaders, Nixon left larger bureaucratic organizations like the State and Defense Departments less
influence over policy. The NSC, by default, gained political clout under this new informal power hierarchy, since
they had influence over Nixon’s decisions through their direct advisement. Thus, Kissinger became more influential
than former National Security Advisors during Nixon’s presidency, as his empowerment granted him influence over
foreign policy in unprecedented ways.
The NSC became influential during the Nixon Administration as well, and Kissinger took advantage of the strengths
of this group since, according to him, it could “avoid the endless internal negotiations that stultify larger
organizations.”23 The NSC, because of its size, acted decisively and promptly in its provision of advisement and
information, as the organization lacked numerous dissenting voices larger bureaucracies faced. This became
problematic in creating diplomacy regarding the Arab-Israel crisis. Since the State Department held official control
within the Middle East while the NSC held a large amount of unofficial control of the president’s decisions through
its increased role in advisement issues, conflict and tension between these two agencies came into fruition within
the process of formulating policy. Therefore, because State Department-negotiated plans became subjugated to
stringent dissection and analysis by the NSC, the Council through its advisement of the president, played a vital
role in his acceptance or rejection of the State Department’s proposed analysis and policies. The early delegation
of roles for foreign policy-making among the agencies and members within the Nixon Administration ultimately set
the stage for interdepartmental competition for influence and authority. Similarly, the early division of power
within the Nixon executive formed the basis for the administration’s competence and failure in creating cohesive
policies. These predetermined roles guided the creation of policy to alleviate the Arab-Israeli crisis, and set the
foundation for the expansion of NSC power within the creation of policy for the Middle East.
The NSC’s first meeting set the official guidelines and boundaries for the policy influence held by the organization
within the realm of their own role in advisement and its relation to the State Department and other foreign policy-

70 Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5

4

Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan

“Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”
oriented bureaucracies. During this meeting, the President stated that the CIA director would provide briefings at
future NSC meetings, and other cabinet members would occasionally present reports as well, equipping the NSC
with a wide nexus of information by which to make their analysis. Additionally, Nixon set limitations on NSC
membership and listed guidelines to formalize the way in which the group would conduct its meetings24 These
conditions revealed Nixon’s initial intentions regarding the formation of policy and the flow of power within his
administration, as he emphasized the NSC’s authority in policy advisement, and further stated that the president
made final policy decisions alone. Nixon claimed that the “NSC was not a decision-making body,” and further
stated, “I will make the decisions. To do this, I will need all points of view. I will then deliberate in private and make
the decision. In this process, I might talk to individuals prior to finalizing my decision.”25 In this way, the president
gave advisement the final authority in the creation of foreign policy, and granted the NSC the authority in the
creation of comprehensive advisement. The organization’s wide purview in the creation of foreign policy, thus, was
established through its access to a wide network of information, provided by the briefings of other cabinet
officials, and through the President’s reliance on the advisement of well-informed parties to make policy decisions.
The NSC, with Kissinger as the head of the group, became the established leader in advisement for the president
due to the insulation of the group. Nixon claimed that “he did not want detailed debriefings in the respective
departments following an NSC meeting, adding that he was conscience of the struggles for power within and
among agencies and that leaks to the press had become a habitual vehicle for this in-fighting.”26 Therefore, while
the NSC had access to information from the CIA, the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, the State
Department, and other executive entities, the conclusions and analysis of the NSC became available only to those
attending the meetings. This emphasis on an insulated entity for policy analysis, coupled with Kissinger’s personal
influence of Nixon, would provide the NSC a means to gain an immense amount of influence over foreign policy.
During the course of this meeting, the president also granted official authority over the mitigation of the ArabIsraeli conflict to the State Department. Within the course of the meeting, Nixon granted the State Department the
power of proposing solutions for the Arab-Israeli conflict, while he requested advisement and briefings from the
CIA Director and the Defense Secretary.27 The State Department officially then held the authority over policy
creation within the Nixon Administration. This was evident through the creation of diplomatic relations and
negotiated policy by the Secretary of State and Undersecretary Sisco to create the Rogers Plan. On the other hand,
while the president empowered the State Department to make policy proposals, his emphasis on advisement and
his own decision-making provided the NSC the availability to curtail its power of advisement into a power of policymaking. The organization became powerful through Nixon’s utilization of it as his main source of culminated
knowledge on foreign policy issues. The NSC also monopolized intelligence, as other departments shared their
knowledge to the organization, which they then passed as their own. For example, other departments often
debriefed issues to the NSC that pertained to the Arab-Israeli crisis. During one meeting alone the director of the
CIA reported on Soviet intentions and Fedayeen movements in the region, the Secretary of Defense discussed the
strategic position of the U.S. in the Middle East, and had the Secretary of State provided information on the
proceedings of the Two Power and Four Power talks, all pursuant to the president’s request.28 The NSC meetings,
therefore, became a means to exchange information, and then have the incoming information processed by
Kissinger and other Council members. After other agencies provided information regarding the U.S. position in
geopolitical issues, the Special Review Group (SRG), a subsection of the NSC analyzed these reports, and the NSC
then took these accounts into consideration to provide comprehensive advisement to the president.29 The NSC,
through this procedure, became a mechanism for creating policy; its direct contact with the president provided an
avenue for Kissinger to leverage greater influence in the Nixon Administration in general, and in the creation of
U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli crisis in particular.
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Nixon’s objectives, beyond his endeavors to re-organize the executive branch, were largely focused on the realm of
international affairs, as he wanted his administration to be more adept in global politics than his domestically
focused predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. With the Vietnam War in the forefront of the American public’s mind, Nixon
attempted to avoid direct military engagements as a means of intervening in international politics. Instead, the
Nixon Administration emphasized the need to negotiate diplomatic agreements with the Soviet Union on a global
scale (a concept known within his administration as “linkage”) and to provide military and economic assistance to
ideological allies.30 Therefore, when negotiating peace in regional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict in the
Middle East, the U.S. often perceived regional powers, such as Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, in terms of the Cold War
conflict, morphing allies and enemies out of a state’s perceived alliance to either the United States or the Soviet
Union.31 This global affairs perspective was organized in reference to Soviet and U.S. tensions, which complicated
the execution of negotiations for diplomatic agreements, as well as influenced the very framework by which the
administration would organize diplomatic negotiations.
Within this administrative context, members of the Nixon executive speculated the best course of action regarding
the organization of negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The two options proposed by the Nixon
cabinet were to either hold a four-power talk, including the U.S., the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, or to hold a
two-power talk, including only the U.S. and the Soviet Union.32 Initially, Kissinger told Assistant Secretary of State
Sisco that the four powers talk was acceptable “in principle,” as long as the president approved of that avenue of
negotiation.33 However, he insisted that Rogers propose the idea of two party talks to the French, while still
pursuing the idea of four power negotiations.34 According to the ideology of the Nixon Administration, two-power
talks were preferable in order to maximize the protection of national interests within the era of détente relations
with the Soviets; however, an exclusion of French and British interests might have offended the European allies.
The official documents discussing this debate made it clear that Rogers considered the inclusion of the French and
the British at the negotiating table as necessary due to Rogers’ repeated request to Kissinger for the inclusion of
the Europeans in negotiations.35 On the other hand, Kissinger and Nixon seemed more apprehensive about the
four power talks, without at least holding separate two power talks with the Soviets. The president, within the
course of a meeting regarding this issue, responded to the proposal of a four-power negotiation by stating, “The
real powers are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.”36 In a similar manner, Kissinger, at the same meeting, asserted that talks
with the Soviets would “prove more fruitful” than talks with that included the Britain and France as well.37
Nonetheless, Kissinger conveyed concern to Nixon that these talks would put the U.S. in a tactically deficient
position, stating, “If we were specific we would be in a major brawl with Israel… And if we shied away from
pressing Israel… the negotiations would again grind to a halt.”38 The State Department held separate two-power
and four-power talks regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict to resolve this tension of opinions.39
Much of Kissinger’s disagreement with State Department policy during the timeframe of Nixon’s first term as
president came from his divergence from the policies proposed by Secretary Rogers. Nixon initially placed Rogers
in charge of managing the conflict in the Middle East, which formed one of the first foreign policy initiatives of his
administration. Rogers organized and controlled negotiations that pertained to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as
announced the peace plan, later known as the “Rogers Plan,” on December 9, 1969 after months of deliberation
with the Soviets within the “Two-Power Talks” (the “Four Power” talks proved to be less influential within the
negotiating process). 40 This plan called for Arab nations to officially recognize the state of Israel under the
presumption that Israel would be bound to rescind their claims to lands gained in the Six-Day War, specifically in
the Sinai Peninsula, to settle the Palestinian refugee crisis amicably, and to make permanent arrangements with
Arab States in regard to the Gaza strip.41 Rogers drew from United Nations Resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) as the
basis for the plan, which the UN published in November 1967 following the conclusion of the Six-Day War. This
resolution illustrated stipulations for peace previously proposed in UNSCR 242, including the return of lands gained

72 Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5

6

Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan

“Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”
in war in exchange for recognition of legitimacy, without an indication of which demand would be met first. In his
December 1969 speech, Rogers made bold claims in regard to Arab-Israeli peace, where he stated that his plan
would provide a “just and lasting peace,” as it would not simply amend the Arab-Israeli conflict temporarily, but
end tensions between Israel and the Arab nations. He also stipulated that it would foster development toward
creating amicable relations between the Palestinian refugees and the state of Israel.42 This plan, however, proved
too ambitious to create “lasting peace,” and instead led to lowering expectations for the mitigation of the conflict.
Rogers presented this plan as something that he perceived as a “balanced and fair approach.” even though this
rhetoric portrayed a sense of idealism, which contrasted the ultra-realist ideology that became prevalent between
Kissinger and other policy leaders later in the Nixon Administration.43 Rogers, in contrast to other individuals in the
administration, did not hold visibly preferential opinions regarding the Arab-Israeli crisis, as he did not openly show
overwhelming support for either the Arab or the Israeli side of the conflict. His approach to policies similarly
tended to reflect an equitable approach to disseminating the conflict. This perspective reflected the “evenhanded” approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy former UN Ambassador William Scranton espoused a year earlier
in December 1968 during a trip to Israel where he asserted, “It is important for the United States to deal with all
countries in the area and not necessarily espouse one.”44 Although this angered the Israeli government, this idea
became an initiative taken up by many bureaucrats involved in U.S. policy-making, including Secretary Rogers.45
The State Department’s openness to work with various parties involved in the conflict is also reflected in Rogers’
pursuit of diplomatic solutions with the Soviets in the Two-Power Talks, as well as in the State Department’s
analysis of U.S. interests in the Middle East. In a memo sent from the secretary of state to the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow on December 17, 1969 that estimated the current position of the Soviets in the Middle East and predicted
their future stances in the region, Rogers asserted, “a complete US-Israel versus Soviet-Arab polarization could
entail a dangerous rise in tension in the area” which would not be beneficial to the pursuit of peace between the
Arab and Israeli states.46 While Rogers claimed that such a polarized alliance in the Middle East could become
detrimental to the possibility of Arab-Israeli peace, and that providing economic aid to Arab states probably would
not endanger the balance of regional influence between the two superpowers, he also claimed that if the Arab
nations became solely allied with the Soviets the U.S.S.R. would be significantly materially drained. Though this
seems like a material advantage to the U.S. in the Cold War, this statement, taken in the context of détente
relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., implied that the ideological division of the Middle East that would
inevitably result from an overwhelming U.S. support for Israel could potentially shatter the desired balance of
power between the Americans and Soviets. Thus, Rogers’ focus on “even-handedness” relied mainly on taking
regional issues into consideration over Cold War geopolitical considerations. The implications of this conflict on the
issues among Middle Eastern states, for all intents and purposes, were a more important focus for Rogers’
negotiations than building U.S. power within the atmosphere of détente relations with the Soviets.
However, Rogers’ approach was constructed within the realm of diplomatic negotiations between superpowers,
and excluded the states actually affected by the proposed plan from the negotiating table. The Secretary also
rendered a somewhat pro-interventionist attitude (or at least pro-interventionist in cases of imposing diplomacy)
in his December 9 speech announcing the Rogers Plan. While he recognized the power to implement peace
remained with the governments affected by the plan, Rogers claimed that it was the “duty” of the United States
and the Soviet Union, as third parties and the major world powers, to provide a “realistic framework” for peace
negotiations.47 Thus, Rogers, while verbally admitting that diplomacy remained in the hands of the nations
affected by the plan, implied that the U.S., as a world superpower, intended to be intensely involved in the peacemaking process in the Middle East. Although this approach to diplomacy was typical for many among Nixon’s
administration, Rogers’ practice of excluding pertinent nations from diplomatic talks, coupled with the Secretary’s
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comparative lack of knowledge and experience in Middle Eastern politics, contributed to ignorant negotiations
between the Soviets and the U.S., and factored into the Arabs and Israelis eventual rejection of the proposed plan.
Ultimately, he came into the Two-Power Talks with unrealistic and uninformed perceptions about the Arab-Israeli
crisis, and, the plan’s introduction to the Arab and Israeli parties resulted in unfavorable responses, especially
among Israeli politicians.48 Since the plan excluded the voices of the parties subject to the plan, the negotiations
proved ineffective, and the idea of “linkage” proved inefficient due to Rogers’ relative inexperience in foreign
policy.
Kissinger, despite his well-known expertise in Cold War international relations, was also initially unaware of the
many diplomatic issues in Middle Eastern policy-making when he first entered the office of National Security
Advisor, and his only knowledge about the region came from a three personal trips to Israel to visit former Harvard
students and colleagues working in the region.49 Nevertheless, he quickly developed policy approaches to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically regarding the conflict’s affects on the region and fit and the wider arena of Cold
War strategy. Furthermore, he adhered to his newly found strong opinions about the conflict within his role as
advisor to the President. The State Department’s stances concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Johnson
Administration differed immensely from the policy stances of the Nixon Administration, especially within the realm
of “unofficial” planning among bureaucrats. The differences between the State Department’s proposed policy
under Johnson and the Nixon Administration’s actions in the Middle East revealed this clear shift in policy. On
January 30, 1969, Harold Saunders sent Kissinger a memorandum that accompanied a group plans that State
Department developed during the Johnson Administration and the early months of the Nixon administration. He
stated that official channels had not yet cleared these documents, but that the proposed policy was “well on its
way” to becoming formalized policy. He also claimed that these plans should be viewed as “illustrative of our
efforts to figure out where we want to come in on an Arab-Israeli settlement.”50 These rough plans clarified how
the wider bureaucracy analyzed and reacted to the conflict, and revealed consistent though from non-political
lower-level members of the State Department about solutions for the area beyond the politics of higher-level
political appointees. These bureaucrats were not members of a politicized administration; rather, they held more
allegiance to their specific department than to a specific party or administration. The differences between these
plans in comparison to Kissinger’s outlined plans reflected the impending differences and political competition
between the larger bureaucracy of the State Department and the political influence of the NSA.
Within these plans, the State Department recommended a possible allocation of land between Israel and its Arab
neighbors to be proposed within negotiations, and represented this redistribution of land through various maps.
According to the State Department, their intended policy followed the “principles and provisions set forth in
Security Council Resolution 242.”51 This proposed plan for land reallocation thus included the return of lands that
Israel gained in the 1967 War from its Arab neighbors. The first map represented a proposal of land negotiations
between Egypt and Israel, and reflected the transfer of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel to Egypt, on the basis of this
land remaining demilitarized.52 This plan would, effectively, become the plan accepted in 1979 in the Camp David
Accords; however, this plan would have been less palatable during the Nixon Administration, especially by
Kissinger. His skepticism regarding the Arab states in general particularly Egypt, coupled with his emphatic support
for Israeli retention of lands gained in the 1967 War, made the NSA less willing to adhere to the State
Department’s advisement regarding this land redistribution.
The second map represented the allocation of land in Eastern Israel to Jordan, pushing Jordan’s border past the
Dead Sea and Bethlehem towards Jerusalem. Similarly, this plan granted Jordanian rule over various areas in
northeastern Israel and Gaza, and advocated for an access road between Jordan’s borders in the east toward the
Gaza strip in the west, in order to enable unobstructed access to Jordan’s citizens.53 The third map divided the city
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of Jerusalem, and conceded rule of the eastern side of the city to Jordan.54 Furthermore, the legal analysis of the
State Department, as portrayed in these documents, asserted that the stipulation for Arab recognition of Israeli
legitimacy in return for the return of Arab territories from Israel did not extend to a formal political declaration
from Arab nations that Israel was a legitimate state. Thus, Israel would not have obtained the desired public
recognition as a state as other policy-makers thought the UNSCR 242 inferred. These plans would have likely been
unfavorable to Kissinger, who thought that a plan that included a return of borders to their position before the
1967 War would “lead to a blowup with both sides.”55 The difference between Kissinger’s opinion regarding land
allocation to the Arab states, which would be reflected in his later advisement of his department, other
bureaucrats, and the president, highlighted the competition that was present between the NSC and the State
Department.
According to State Department legal analysts, the language of UNSCR 242 and the nature of international law only
implied that Arab states would be forced to deal with Israel as a legitimate state within their diplomatic relations.56
Thus, these stipulations for the return of land would not be followed by a public means of reciprocation from Arab
states, which, to a supporter of the Israeli state such as Kissinger, seemed like it put Israel to a disadvantage. The
unofficial plan also outlined resolutions regarding demilitarization and the means towards an amicable relationship
between various groups involved in the conflict; supporters of Israeli national interests, however, perceived plans
such as these to be a weakening of the state of Israel through diplomatic means. The plan called for the
demilitarization of the Sinai from both the United Arab Republic (UAR/Egypt) and Israel, from the mandated region
of Palestine, and from Gaza.57 Additionally, the plan called for giving Palestinian individuals within the Israeli state,
through the aid of the UN, the option to either be resettled into a neighboring repatriated country, or to live in
Israel with the protection of the Israeli state.58 It also called for the Israeli government to pay reparations to
Palestinian individuals who chose to stay within Israel’s borders and to publicly state that Palestinians would not
face discrimination.59 Thus, the state of Israel would be forced to assert that they had been in the wrong with their
treatment of the Palestinian people, and would lose monetary power and power over individuals within their
borders. This weakening of the perceived power of Israel was something that Kissinger directly combated within
his time in the Nixon Administration. His disagreements with the proposed State Department plans proved that he
not only disagreed with policy-makers specifically, but his opinions largely differed with the State Department as a
whole.
Kissinger’s views regarding the crises differed immensely from Secretary Rogers and of the State Department due
to his perspectives on the regional and geopolitical role the U.S. should play in the conflict. He was less concerned
about balancing Israeli and Arab interest, and instead chose to support Israeli interests in his policy advisement,
which led to conflict between the State Department and the NSC. Kissinger viewed the general concept of
diplomacy as a means of balancing power and keeping peace through strength; to him, diplomacy was a tool to
maintain U.S. power, in a similar manner to utilizing military buildings a means to protect a nation’s security:
The balance of power, a concept much maligned in American political writing- rarely used without
being preceded by the pejorative ‘outdated’- has in fact been the precondition of peace. A calculus
of power, of course, in only the beginning of policy; it cannot be its sole purpose. The fact remains
that without strength even the most elevated purpose risks being overwhelmed by the dictates of
others.60
Under this perspective, Kissinger focused less on “even-handedness” than on the best means to maximize U.S.
power in the Middle East, and, according to Kissinger’s policy advisement during this time, the best means of
maximizing U.S. power was through its support of Israeli state interests.
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Documents that referred to the Arab-Israeli issue between 1969-1970 were largely produced for advisement on
issues such as balancing power between the United States and the Soviet Union, providing arms funding to Israel,
and approaches to negotiating terms of peace. These documents along with Kissinger’s autobiography reveal the
NSA’s protective stance towards Israeli interests. Kissinger advocated against American interference through
negotiations in the Arab-Israeli crisis to a certain extent, because certain factors in Middle Eastern politics, such as
Soviet interests, Egyptian military power, and Fedayeen activity, made the region “not ready for a comprehensive
American initiative.”61 Kissinger’s rhetoric also alluded to an underlying disapproval for policies that proved strict
or unfavorable for the state of Israel. In a memorandum to Nixon dated September 10, 1969 which was an outline
for a meeting with the NSC to provide guidance for the State Department negotiations with the Soviet Union to
create a plan for peace in the Middle East, Kissinger stated that “Israel will not be satisfied even if we win Nasser’s
commitment to direct negotiations… Only strong US pressure, if that, has a chance of moving Israel away from that
position.”62 However, he did not ultimately advocate for “strong U.S. pressure,” and instead supported a stance of
non-interference, not solely because such action would necessarily be beneficial to promoting regional peace
between the two conflicting factions, but because of a perceived danger in the disruption of Israeli-U.S relations.
He also claimed in this memorandum that a settlement calling for Israel’s retreat from lands gained in the 1967
War, would not likely be accepted by the Israeli government, as it left nothing for the state to utilize in
negotiations. If Israel submitted to these terms at all, Kissinger asserted that the facets of the plan allowed Arab
nations to narrowly define their means of recognizing a legitimate Israeli state. According to Kissinger, this would
“have given the Arabs and the Soviets what they want- and isolated Israel.”63 Furthermore, Kissinger believed that
the support of Israeli national interests, to an extent, benefitted the United States in a wider geopolitical context.
According to Kissinger, the role of the NSA was not to advise on “tactical issues,” but to focus on “long-range
matters.”64 Thus, he focused his attention to what he deemed as more long-term issues, such as balancing global
power influenced his perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Rogers’ focused on promoting regional
peace through negotiations of an Arab-Israeli peace plan, Kissinger focused on balancing global power, as he
believed that a certain amount of support for the Israelis benefitted the U.S. in the race for power in the Cold War.
Furthermore, he stated that the relations became a dangerous point of policy in the U.S.- Soviet power struggle, as
he claimed “the region became the focal point of Cold War rivalry, which both acerbated local conflict and posed
the danger that outside powers could be dragged into major confrontation.” 65 In this way, he asserted that the
pursuit of a balance of power between the two states best offered the protection of regional interests, as it limited
the possibility of a Vietnam-like Cold War conflict in the region.
Kissinger also thought of Arab states as “traditional regimes, discredited by defeat, [that] came under the sway of
radical ideology- Pan-Arabism and socialism,” and he also considered these states to be under the influence of the
Soviet Union 66 This perspective of Soviet interest among the Arab states caused Kissinger to distrust Egypt in
particular, since the state received support from the USSR. He stated that he “preferred an Israeli-Jordanian
settlement…rather than Israeli- negotiations, in which we would be asked to bail out a Soviet protégé,” and
claimed that the Egyptians wanted the U.S. to abandon their support for Israel with very little trade-off on their
part. 67 Egypt’s perceived ties to the Soviet Union strengthened Kissinger’s already existent alignment with Israeli
interests, as combatting the UAR against Israel translated into combatting Soviet interests in the Middle East.
Therefore, he supported Israel because of his conception of the Arab-Israeli conflict within two frameworks: the
Cold War and the regional issue.
Moreover, Kissinger perceived the precepts of UNSCR 242 to be unattainable and impractical. In fact, the first time
that the National Security Advisor heard other foreign policy leaders presenting to him the “sacramental language
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, mumbling about the need for a just and lasting peace within

76 Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5

10

Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan

“Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”
secure and recognized borders” he stated that he "thought the phrase so platitudinous that I accused the speaker
of pulling my leg.”68 Kissinger believed that the states involved would not easily accept the precepts of the
resolution. According to Kissinger, the Arabs and the Israelis viewed UNSCR 242 fundamentally in different ways,
specifically in issues of Israel return of territory. He claimed, “This gulf in perceptions- in which, as in all tragedies,
both sides represented a truth- is what had given the Arab-Israeli conflict its bitter intractability. When truths
collide, compromise becomes the first casualty. Agreements are achieved only through evasions.”69 In his opinion,
the lack of consensus between those involved in the conflict regarding the proper means to employ a given
resolution made the process of negotiating peace based on UNSCR 242 nearly impossible.
To a certain extent, Kissinger advocated against American interference through negotiations in the Arab-Israeli
crisis. He asserted that this kind of interference would hurt U.S. interests in the region; he “did not think that
manhandling our closest allies would achieve the lasting gratitude of Nasser or those who admired him.”70 This
idea was reiterated in a memorandum from Kissinger regarding later Arab-Israeli issues, in which he clearly utilized
a lack of action in the Middle East to support Israeli national interests. In 1971, a few months after Rogers aided
the acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire, Kissinger stated in a memo to President Nixon, “A confrontation
with Israel now would virtually end chances of any negotiated Arab-Israeli arrangement for the next year or so…”71
Kissinger, in this way, took a stance of non-interference, not because such action would necessarily be beneficial to
promoting regional peace among the two conflicting factions, but because of a perceived danger in the disruption
of Israeli-U.S.
Nonetheless, not all of these documents do reflect a strong disagreement with the policies of the State
Department. In a memorandum to the president, dated July 19, 1969, an agreement, outlined between the NSC
and the State Department, limited the impact of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear technology and weaponry through
negotiations with Golda Meir to halt some forms of nuclear testing.72 This document outlined a form of
camaraderie between the departments, including the State Department and the Defense Department, and,
therefore, much of the language largely supported of the ideas of the various bureaucracies. Similarly, in this
document, Kissinger neither opposed intervention in Israeli affairs, nor does he take a significant pro-Israel stance.
In regard to the proliferation of nuclear arms, Kissinger, as well as the NSC, advocated for arms control and
intervention in Israeli policies. While the NSA showed a preference for allowing the state of Israel to conduct its
own business in regard to negotiations over issues of settling conflict with Arab nations, and further supported the
provision of smaller arms to Israel’s military, Kissinger favored U.S. diplomatic involvement in Israeli affairs in order
to maintain a controlled nuclear world and control the proliferation of advanced weaponry. Furthermore, his
treatment of Israel within his policy advisement reflected a standard of intense support for the state’s interests,
but only when such support did not interfere with a valid state interest of the U.S., such as nuclear arms control.
Kissinger’s relationship with other members of the NSC, the State Department and other foreign policy related
bureaucracies, contributed significantly to the creation of American policy for the Middle East regarding IsraeliArab relations. As made evident through these interactions, Kissinger’s growing influence in the executive branch
enabled him to enforce his foreign policy goals within this crisis. Kissinger’s relationship and correspondence with
other lower-level bureaucrats reflected his expansion of power within the State Department. He wrote in his
autobiography that the State Department acquired their role in brokering an Arab-Israeli peace plan because of
the immense talent of the “intense, gregarious” character of Joseph Sisco, the Undersecretary of State who was in
charge of the Middle East; an individual who “turned out to be living proof of what imaginative leadership could
achieve in the State Department even under a President determined to conduct his own foreign policy….with a
talent for stratagems that are the lifeblood of Middle East diplomacy, sometimes offering more solutions than
there were problems.73 Kissinger imparted more responsibility to Sisco than he granted to Secretary Rogers. This
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confidence was further reflected in his correspondence with Sisco, as he kept in contact with him regarding the
negotiations and the terms of the US peace plan. Kissinger advised Sisco on topics ranging from the terminology
used in addressing the Jordanian government, to the practical application of a peace plan considering the national
interests of Israel.74 Additionally, he conversed more broadly with Sisco on policy issues than he typically did with
Rogers. For example, at one point he even asked Sisco on his perspective regarding the political situation in Korea
and Nixon’s public relations.75 Nixon recognized this relationship as well, and he even asked Kissinger and Sisco to
draw up contingency plans that contrasted State Department plans in anticipation of the possibility of the Arabs
and the Israelis reacting badly to the Rogers Plan.76 Sisco became a close advisor of Kissinger, and the relationship
he held with the NSA lacked the ideological and adversarial tension that existed between Rogers and Kissinger, and
Kissinger utilized Sisco in order to gain relations within the State Department without deferring to the Secretary of
State. After Kissinger became Secretary of State in Nixon’s second administration, he made Sisco his
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, where he became Kissinger’s “indispensable collaborator and a close
friend.”77 His relationship with Sisco became a strong unofficial means of obtaining political power within the
federal executive for Kissinger, since he could influence State Department policy without deferring to the official
head of State policy, the Secretary of State.
Kissinger’s preference for Israeli national interests was evident in his interactions with other bureaucrats, as he
often wished to avoid any appearance of anti-Israeli sentiment within the espousal and creation of foreign policy
within the U.S. government. He actively advocated against propositions for policy initiatives that he viewed as
endangering the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Prior to the final deliberations of the Two Party talks,
Kissinger privately asked Sisco why Israel should be compelled to comply with a peace agreement that would be
negotiated by non-involved nations based on the UNSCR 242. 78 According to Kissinger’s conceptualization of
diplomacy, the procession of these negotiations undermined the legitimacy of the state of Israel, and, therefore,
jeopardized the relationship between the U.S. and its ally. This desire to support the nation of Israel even extended
to the micro-managing of speeches so they would not take on any seemingly anti-Israeli implications through their
language. For example, Kissinger debated the phrasing of segment of a speech with Undersecretary Sisco, stating
that the Jordanian King blamed Israel for tension in the Middle East, so far as to make sure that the phrasing of the
speech made it “perfectly plain that it is his view and not ours.”79
Robert Anderson, an aid to Kissinger who served as an advisor on Middle Eastern issues, similarly corresponded
with Kissinger on Israeli interests. In a telephone conversation on February 1969, he relayed a conversation that he
had with an Israeli minister regarding the consolidation of relations between nations. Anderson told Kissinger of
the Israeli interest in negotiating certain terms regarding the return of land in relation to UNSCR 242 and their
interest in strengthening relations with the U.S. He explained that, if the US took into consideration the Israeli
interests in regard to territorial concerns into consideration, relations might be strengthened between the two
countries.80 This correspondence revealed the existence of a separate process of creating policy through the NSC
and Kissinger, which existed separately from the State Department’s process of negotiations and deliberations
with the Soviet Union that would lead to the Rogers Plan. While the existence of this policy-making was not a
devious undermining of State Department policy, it did reflect that Kissinger, along with the National Security
Council, pursued separate policies from the State Department.
These unofficial channels of influence bypassed the official power of Rogers and his negotiations. Rogers,
according to Kissinger, lacked sufficient experience and capability in creating effective policies, which lead Kissinger
to take power for himself and his office. Kissinger and Rogers, with divergent political ideologies and perspectives
on the Middle East, also worked toward different goals in this area. Though not openly confrontational, Kissinger
held doubts from the beginning of Nixon’s presidency about Rogers’ ability to lead, claiming that “It was probably

78 Voces Novae, Vol 7, No 1 (2015)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol7/iss1/5

12

Parish: "Compromise Becomes the First Casualty": The Effects of the Expan

“Compromise Becomes the First Casualty”
unfair to appoint to the senior Cabinet position someone whose entire training and experience had been in other
fields.”81 Similarly, he admonished the appointment of Rogers:
This is a particular problem for a Secretary of State. He is at the head of an organization staffed by
probably the ablest and most professional group of men and women in public service…. But the reverse
side of their dedication is the conviction that a lifetime of service and study has given them insights that
transcend the untrained and shallow-rooted views of political appointees.82
According to Kissinger, Nixon’s Secretary of State lacked relevant familiarity with issues of international relations
and qualifying skills to run a department as fundamentally necessary and extremely talented as that of the State
Department. Moreover, Nixon, according to Kissinger, contributed to this conflict, since “like other Presidents,
[Nixon] was not above feeding the rivalry inherent (despite ritualistic protestations to the contrary) between the
office of the Secretary of State and security advisor in order to enhance his own control.”83 His opinion regarding
the ineptitude of Secretary Rogers, in addition to his essential disagreements with State Department opinions of
Middle Eastern issues, ultimately culminated to a lack of regard for State Department policy.
The Israeli government immediately rejected the proposed peace plan Rogers announced its precepts in a speech
on December 9, 1969, and the Israeli cabinet further rejected “any attempt to enforce a solution” by December 22.
By January 1970, the Israelis and the Egyptians dismissed the terms of the Rogers Plan (the only nation to accept
its terms was Jordan), and the Israelis escalated their bombing campaign of the mid-section of Egypt.84 This peace
plan generally upset the wider Israeli public. According to an Israeli newspaper after the secretary made his speech
announcing the plan,
Israeli circles appeared especially distressed by Mr. Rogers’ reference to points which, in Israel’s
view, should be subjects of direct negotiations with the Arabs. They said the U.S. has always
maintained that it wants to help bring the two parties together… But now that America has made
public its plan for Israeli withdrawal, it appears to be turning away from its previous policy, they
said.85
Although this bombing campaign was part of the ongoing War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, this escalation
caused the Egyptians to seek Soviet assistance.86 Consequently, the U.S. readjusted the means by which they
proceeded to relieve tensions in the Middle East, and the State Department also reformulated the proposed
Rogers Plan in order to accommodate these occurrences. This eventually resulted in a ceasefire agreement,
deemed “Rogers Plan B.”87 To facilitate the mitigation of this new plan, the U.S. negotiated not only with the
Soviets through Ambassador Dobrymin, but spoke directly with the nations involved: Undersecretary Sisco talked
with Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser while President Nixon talked with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.88 Although
these events changed the scope of the crisis that the U.S. was attempting to mitigate, these changes in policy goals
provided the opportunity for the NSC to acquire more power while the State Department endeavored to negotiate
a solution.89 The members of the foreign policy related organizations within U.S. executive were forced to make
decisions regarding issues such as the provision of military aid to Israel, the maintenance of relations with the
Egyptian state, and the diplomatic mitigation of the imminent conflict in the months following the Israeli’s initial
attack upon the state of Egypt. Through these diplomatic negotiations, Rogers attempted to uphold some tenets of
his original plan within his negotiation for a cease-fire; however, these attempts for diplomatic peace were
undermined by the decision to increase military aid to empower the Israeli state. Therefore, the State Department
led negotiations were met with the NSC’s competing policy for providing Israel with arms, which contributed to the
interdepartmental competition for dominance in this policy-making field.
Much of the concern leading to the NSC’s recommendations regarding military aid to Israel were based in the fear
of Soviet encroachment and aggression in the region. As the conflict within the Middle East became more actively
militarized, the possibility of indirect conflict with the Soviets increased. According to Kissinger, “Israel’s foreign
policy had become indistinguishable from its defense policy” and Israel needed military provision in order to avoid
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encroachment from its neighbors.90 The provision of aid, therefore, provided the U.S. a means by which to bargain
with Israel. In a memo attached to a SRG policy analysis, Harold Saunders, a NSC member who specialized in
Middle Eastern affairs, addressed the question: “What if Israeli attacks trigger Soviet retaliation?”91 Because of this
fear, the NSC, along with Kissinger, focused on more practical, “reliable” solutions to combat this possibility. The
U.S. government combined negotiations with Arab parties, the Soviets, and the Israelis with the agreement to aid
the Israelis with weapons, which both undermined and enabled the negotiation process.
Nixon, during this time, came to approve most Israeli requests for aid, including the provision of Phantom planes
that Israel used to bomb Egypt.92 However, by March 1970, the Nixon Administration announced that they would
hold military aid that Israel had requested, which included 100 Skyhawk jets and 25 Phantom jets, “in abeyance”,93
and Rogers in his announcement of the abeyance of aid claimed that the US would provide Israel economic aid
instead of military aid, unless the Soviets started to provide the UAR with weaponry in which case the US would
return to providing the Israelis with military assistance.94 By July 4, the Nixon Administration provided military aid
to Israel in the form of electronic countermeasure equipment, and the Israelis later negotiated an assurance of
military aid and military sales from the U.S. in accordance to their adherence to the later ceasefire agreement.95 In
fact, the Nixon Administration pursued diplomatic discourse with the intention of eventually providing military aid
to Israel. The State Department-produced talking points for the diplomatic negotiations for a cease-fire explicitly
asserted: “States line [of negotiation] is essentially that Israel should find a way to accept our military assistance as
compensation for the standstill violations and to get on with the talks.”96 Furthermore, the administration held the
belief that “Israel’s receptivity to U.S. suggestions on its negotiating position and tactics will depend partly on
Israel’s assurance that the U.S. is making good on its promise to continue to meet Israel’s security needs.”97 The
SRG conjectured that these arrangements could eventually even lead to a final Israeli peace agreement to end the
War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel,98 though this proved ineffective when Egypt and Israel started
combatting in 1973.99 Though these military assistance plans combatted the practical implications of theoretical
Soviet involvement in the region, the administration was forced to hold a difficult balance between trying to
appear impartial in order to mediate the conflict while providing assistance to the Israelis during the months of
negotiation.
Due to the ongoing tension between the Arabs and the Israelis during the months following the announcement of
the original Rogers Plan and the Israeli aggression toward Egypt, the Nixon Administration made some attempts to
pacify the concerns of the Arabs. The following negotiations and policy-making after Israel’s increased bombing of
Egypt became more contentious as the U.S. walked the line between redeeming their relationship with the Israelis
and appeasing Arab interests. Because of this tension, the competition between factions of the government that
sought the protection of Israeli interests versus the factions that supported more even-handed policies became
more pronounced. While the White House at this time was still largely concerned with Soviet incursion, the State
Department attempted to bridge the gap and build amicable relations in the Middle East by appealing to Arab
interests, while still maintaining supremacy against the Soviets through the diplomatic relations. Thus, Sisco
recommended the redrafting of documents concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to make them “be more
specific on issues of concern to the Arabs.”100 This attempt by Sisco and the State Department portrayed the
divergent goals of the two bureaucratic entities. Though both the State Department and the NSC worked toward
similar goals of maintaining peace in the region while protecting American interests, the two departments utilized
different tactics to fulfill these goals. Similarly, the earlier ideological conflict between Kissinger and Rogers, the
official policies of the two departments during these later negotiations show the difference between the goals of
the bureaucracies that the two leaders headed.
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Nevertheless, the NSC made some concessions that the U.S. needed to address some Arab concerns during this
time. The increasing activity of the Fatah movements in Jordan and in Palestine forced the Nixon Administration to
acknowledge Palestinian issues in their pursuit of peaceful settlements. The SRG’s analysis, which proposed a
process for the pursuit of an effective cease-fire through diplomatic negotiations, suggests that the State
Department explore the Palestinian issue during the course of their talks to the UAR, Jordan, and Israel, since
“Sadat is not likely to sign an agreement before the Palestinians are satisfied.”101 Because of this, the NSC further
investigated the implications of non-governmental Palestinian entities to the U.S. government’s pursuit of Middle
Eastern peace through a SRG analysis. The Administration conducted extensive studies of the Palestinian groups,
where they analyzed their goals, their doctrines, and their tactics. Within the SRG’s proposition of multiple means
by which the U.S. could approach the issue of Fatah movements, the group acknowledged the possibility of
implementing formalized negotiations with the Palestinians, by stating, “While continuing to hold out for the
rectification and against shifting the negotiations to the four powers, we could explore a ‘Palestinian option’-i.e.
the possibility of an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement.”102 Even under Kissinger’s adamantly pro-Israel
leadership of the NSC, the Council still considered the implications and justifications of Palestinian issues.
Ultimately, Sisco sent unofficial representatives to negotiate with Fatah leadership, and notified the SRG, of such
actions, under the impression that “despite Fatah’s stated position that it opposes Security Council Resolution 242
and the U.S. Government peace initiative, certain Fatah officials might be prepared to accept a peace settlement
on these terms if the prospects for successes were good.”103 This further exemplified the State Department’s
adherence to their pursuit of peace through negotiations, as proved by their willingness to comply with nontraditional political forces, even forces not directly related to the U.S. global interests. However, The SRG’s
suggestion insinuated that, at least on some level, the two departments could work together without the
competition for policy control. Yet, the SRG’s statement was only one policy suggestion among many, and did not
necessarily indicate Kissinger’s opinion on the subject of non-governmental Palestinian organizations such as
Fatah. Therefore, the concurrence of NSC and State Department policy opinions in this case, while revealing that
the potential for inter-department unity could have persisted in some means, does not prove that both of the
governmental organizations practiced the implementation of a clearly united policy.
Nonetheless, the Nixon Administration began to present itself to be very supportive of Israeli interests in the public
eye. On July 1, 1970, President Nixon indicated a strong support for Israel in a television interview, and he sent a
letter to Prime Minister Meir later that month stating that the U.S. government “would not force Israel to interpret
our formula the Arab way.”104 This tension between bureaucratic forces supported even-handed diplomacy and
those in support of Israeli initiatives became augmented due to the shift toward pro-Israeli foreign policy.
Due to this, bureaucratic infighting became strikingly apparent during the negotiation of the cease-fire agreement.
This was most evident in the case of the professional relationship between Joseph Sisco and Henry Kissinger. While
the official documents written by Sisco indicated adherence to the policies of the State Department, and thus the
policies of Rogers, other documents revealed Sisco’s slight divergence from the decisions and the leadership of the
Secretary of State. For example, at one point National Security Council member Saunders sent a note to Kissinger,
telling him that Sisco sent a redrafted speech to the White House, despite Rogers explicitly telling him not to send
the document, and asked him to “protect [Sisco] with the Secretary.”105 The redrafted document was a potential
speech for Nixon to give in the case of the successful acceptance of an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire by relevant
parties, which Rogers did not want the White House to see until they effectively negotiated a cease-fire
agreement.106 In this case, Sisco rejected the authority of the Secretary of State in order to adhere to the authority
of the NSC and the White House. Furthermore, Kissinger’s increasing reliance on Sisco for opinions on policy
possibilities during the negotiations for the cease-fire agreement revealed his deference for Sisco’s opinion over
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the opinion of the Secretary of State. The strengthening of this professional relationship represented the
strengthening of this unofficial means of power for both Sisco and Kissinger, which provided them with the
opportunity to bypass this governmental hierarch. This inevitably played into the competition and conflict between
the two bureaucracies throughout the latter half of Nixon’s first term, especially after the escalation of Israeli
bombing after the announcement of the first Rogers Plan.
Egypt, Jordan, and Israel finally accepted Rogers Plan B, negotiated and written by the State Department in June,
after the Nixon Administration convinced political leaders from these perspective countries to accept its terms by
August 1970.107 The UAR accepted these terms unconditionally, and the Israelis eventually accepted the cease-fire
after assurances of military assistance and the sale of U.S. aircraft to Israel.108 The terms of the plan strictly related
to the termination of military aggression, and did not include previous stipulations from the first Rogers Plan
regarding the alleviation of political tensions in the region. This ceasefire agreement dictated that the UAR and
Israel “will observe an effective ceasefire as at 2200 hours GMT, Friday August 7,” which included both infantry
attacks and aerial bombardment. Additionally, it created a region of 100 kilometers wherein neither side could
develop to a military capacity, and the agreement further asserted that each nation could either utilize its own
“national means” or invoke the power of the UN to enforce the ceasefire.109 The U.S. added further “agreements”
for Israel, claiming that Israel should not produce new missiles, missile-emplacement structures, or missile facilities
in the agreed-upon 100-kilometer zone, which placed some informal limitations on the technical advancement of
the Israeli military institution. The U.S. had also agreed to additional “Four Powers” talks with the UK, France, and
the Soviet Union following the cease-fire between the UAR and Israel to negotiate a new, “gradualist” peace
solution and present it to the disputing parties.110
Nonetheless, following the acceptance of this plan the US amended its military assistance. The U.S. government
considered aiding the Israelis essential to maintaining the cease-fire lines and, thus, prepared the Israeli military
for the possibilities of the Egyptian invasion of the Sinai or missile strikes into Israel.111 Due to this, the new U.S.
assistance package to Israel included more reconnaissance aircrafts and electronic countermeasure equipment (i.e.
communications jammers) in order to monitor both the Egyptians and the Soviets per the NSC’s request.112 Thus,
the State Department-led negotiations resulted in the appeasement of military tensions coupled with the
continuance of US military aid to Israel. These conditions did not lighten political tensions between the Arab and
Israeli parties, and this tension would ultimately lead to a war between the UAR and Israel in 1973.113
The development of U.S. policy creation within the context of the Arab-Israeli Crisis in 1969-1970 revealed effects
that accompanied the expansion of the power of Kissinger, and, by extension, the power of the NSC within Nixon’s
first term as president. The Nixon Administration brought about a procedural change within its foreign policyrelated organizations, under which the importance of NSC advisement became more influential than it had been
before. However, the increasing influence of the NSC did not prove to directly undermine or eliminate the
importance of State Department negotiations; rather, NSC analyses and actions served as competition to the
policies and agendas presented by the Department of State. Due to this, the administration faced the implications
of this change in bureaucratic power through its failure to create a comprehensive, innovative policy for the
improvement of Arab-Israeli relations.
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